Another Look at America's Secret War

This month has been an eventful one in the Iraq War. Iraq is continually in danger of being ripped apart even further by the different factions, and nations funding those factions, struggling for dominance. Unfortunately, there are few voices in the media that can or try to provide comprehensive analysis at any real level of depth that enable an understanding the forces in this war.

Those who opposed the war point to every new catastrophe as proof that Iraq is a quagmire. Those who support it complain constantly that the "liberal media" (a humorous concept, indeed) simply refuse to acknowledge the victories that America has achieved in the Middle East. There are times when the truth lies somewhere in the middle, but this is not one of those times. The truth lies buried at a deeper level, and the real failure of the influentials in this debate has been to not provide a framework for understanding the true nature of the Iraq war and the "war on terrorism" on a larger scale.

In 2004, George Friedman, the founder of private intelligence firm Stratfor, released a book, called America's Secret War, designed to change that. The book itself is one of the few books that people on both sides of the debate appreciate, for it is an extremely balanced, given Friedman's occupation, look at the history and current events in the Middle East.

The book is broken into three sections. The first three chapters set the context for what Friedman calls the "the Fourth Global War," a term he later seems to back off from, instead calling it the "U.S.-jihadist" war. In this first section, he provides a concise and well-rounded account of the history and origins of the war. In particular, he tells the fascinating history of U.S. foreign policy mistakes in the context of Islamic civilization.

In the preface, Friedman states "the closer you stand to an object, the less sense it makes. The closer you watch this war, the more incoherent it becomes. This book uses Stratfor's geopolitical method to step back from the events and see the order hidden within." In this respect, and many others, Friedman succeeds wildly. He undertook the tenuous task of providing the context and rational basis for a war which many couldn't understand.

The second section of the book tackles the issue of how American intelligence works (and doesn't work) and why it has been responsible for so many catastrophic failures.

Finally, Friedman uses Sept. 11 as the pivot point of the book and traces the events immediately following the attacks to their origins in this war. Along the way, he writes a compelling history of the war in Afghanistan and paints the picture of that region as perhaps the most dangerous and captivating place on the planet. From there, he attempts to show that the invasion of Iraq was a very bad decision, and at the same time absolutely necessary. He asserts that the decision to invade Iraq had nothing to do with WMD (no news there) or the freedom of the Iraqi people (as the Romantics were led to believe).

These, and all of the other public explanations for the war were indeed lies, but necessary lies, Friedman maintains, in the face of America's need to achieve its true goal: prove to Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Middle East that America is not a military weakling. That's it. That's why we're at war in Iraq. That one is a little harder to use in order to garner public support. The ultimate purpose is to convince Saudi Arabia that we are worse enemies than Al Qaeda so that the Saudi regime will support our efforts to track and destroy the terrorist organization.

Friedman readily admits that this motivation will surprise most Americans who see themselves as powerful, honorable (more on this later) warriors. In the Middle East, however, we are generally looked at as rather insignificant militarily. Of course, we have the ability to project force and influence to almost every corner of the globe, but our political status as a democracy undermines our resolve to fight at any expense, especially if it involves large amounts of U.S. military casualties. Innocent civilian casualties don't seem to bother us so much.

From this proposition, Friedman explains the events of this war as a natural consequence of assuming that we had no other choice. As an American citizen born in the middle of the Cold War, and as one who has seen the Cold War and its players evolve quickly into the leaders of the current conflict, I think it is worth investigating Friedman's, and our government's assumption that we had to go to war. This conclusion was reached too easily. Again, the fundamental motivation was to convince the Middle East, particularly the Saudis, that we are scarier than Al Qaeda. When we have reached this state of affairs, is it not worth questioning whether how we got here was the result of bad decisions instead of blindly following a possibly mistaken assumption to its logical and inevitable conclusion?

The fundamental problem with both this assumption and this "solution" is that when we apply military solutions to complex problems on an increasingly global scale in a context of always-on communications, we not only risk getting ourselves into unsustainable campaigns, we ignore the reality that not every foe can be or should be defeated through a violent response. Nor, when we do respond with violence, do we properly acknowledge our own culpability in the creation of the situation itself.

Such mistakes are dangerous, and will lead to more violence. And more uncontrolled spending. There is no good way to end this war through violence. It will lead to another war, even in the best possible circumstances, within twenty years.

America and the West, throughout recent history, failed to capitalize on its most valuable asset: its cultural influence and image of freedom and prosperity. Instead, we undermine our own freedom and the rest of the world's prosperity through our government's and predatory corporation's attempts to manipulate the global economy in our failure. This provides ammunition for our "enemies."

There are three reasons people go war:

1. They feel the need to protect themselves and their way of life from aggressors.

2. A powerful elite feels the need to protect its interests.

3. People, largely ignorant of the subtleties of war and the global economy yet remain highly idealistic about their own nation's greatness, are duped into fighting for or supporting one of the first two groups as a result of falling prey to Romantic, patriotic imagery and a violent propaganda.

On the last page of the original edition of his book, Friedman makes the following statement:

The weakness of the U.S. is not our soldiers, not their numbers, but the vast distance that separates American leaders from those who fight. From government officials to media moguls to finance power-brokers, few members of the leadership class have children who are at war. To them, the soldiers are alien, people they have never met and don't understand. When the children of the leaders stay home, the leaders think about war in unfortunate ways. As the most powerful nation in the world, we will be fighting many wars. A ruling class that sends the children of others to fight, but not their own, cannot sustain its power for very long.

This war is an excellent example of all three of the above reasons people go to war. One group, radical, conservative Muslims perceive their way of life threatened by Western influence and the influence of corrupt Islamic governments. (Actually more of a concern for them - Al Qaeda wanted the U.S. to invade the Middle East in order to cause the public to rise up against their own governments.) The U.S., the powerful, perceives their interests as jeopardized and has responded with violence abroad and authoritarian measures against its own citizens at home. Finally, members of the third group, a diverse population made up of everybody from NASCAR patriots to Tolkien dreamers who speak of a "just war" have been duped into believing in and fighting for an Administration that has anything but their interests in mind.

The chief characteristic of policy in the 21st century should be a focus not on short term military victories but on a sustainable vision for the future. Perhaps that is too much to ask. But a democracy cannot succeed if its primary vehicle for action in the world relies on expeditionary wars designed to make other nations afraid.

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